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THE FEDERALISM OF CLIMEX
LECTULARIUS: WHAT BED-BUGS TELL
US ABOUT FIFRA PREEMPTION IN
PESTICIDE APPLICATOR CASES
DAVID BEUGELMANS*
INTRODUCTION
During July 2010, a New Jersey exterminator sprayed seventy
residences – including mattresses and toys – with malation and carbaryl to
combat Climex lectularius, otherwise known as bed bugs.1 Both pesticides
are absorbed by the skin and are dangerous at high concentrations.2 During
October 2010, an exterminator hired to eradicate bed bugs in a New York
City elementary school left pesticides puddled “on the teachers’ desks, on
the children’s desks, on their books, [and] on the floor,” with cleanup costs
of more than $200,000.3 Despite such close calls, state authorities clamored
for EPA exemptions4 of non-indoor use pesticides to combat the bed bug

Copyright © 2011 by David Beugelmans.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD); B.A., Politics,
2009, University of California, Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz, CA).
1. Judy Peet, DEP Orders Exterminator to Clean Up Toxic Residue, THE STAR-LEDGER,
July 13, 2010 at 9.
2. Id.; see also Malathion for Mosquito Control, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, available at
http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/health/mosquitoes/malathion4mosquitoes.htm (last updated July 7,
2008) (“[A]t high doses, malathion, like other organophosphates, can over-stimulate the nervous
system causing nausea, dizziness, or confusion. Severe high-dose poisoning with any
organophosphate can cause convulsions, respiratory paralysis, and death.”); Amended
Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED) for Carbaryl, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 9 (Aug. 2008),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/reregistration/REDs/carbaryl-red-amended.pdf
(“[C]arbaryl is currently classified as . . . ‘likely to be carcinogenic to humans.’”).
3. Art McFarland, Bed bug ridding chemicals contaminate school, WABC, Oct. 26, 2010,
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=7748002.
4. Matt Leingang, US Grapples With Bedbugs, Misuse of Pesticides, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 30, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100831/ap_on_re_us/us_bedbug_conundrum.
Recently, Governor Strickland of Ohio pleaded with EPA to issue an emergency exemption for
home use of propoxur, a pesticide the agency has banned from home use and considers a probably
carcinogen. Id. EPA Administrator Jackson denied his request. Id.
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epidemic.5 Justified or not, the pandemonium of the 2010 bed bug epidemic
exemplifies how hazardous pesticides may come into contact with
unknowing individuals. The potential for harm also raises the question how
the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide and Fungicide Act (“FIFRA”)6 may
preempt claims against negligent pesticide applicators.
FIFRA includes express preemption language regarding state labeling
requirements.7 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc.8 clarified this preemption
language in manufacturer cases.9 After Bates, courts cannot impose a
blanket preemption regime where all claims invoking FIFRA labeling
requirements are automatically preempted.10 In this settled landscape,
however, one area of uncertainty remains: FIFRA preemption of claims
against pesticide applicators.11 Courts have relied on wildly divergent
rational, leaving them divided on how claims against applicators implicate
FIFRA labeling requirements.12 Under the Bates preemption regime, these
divergent theories operate in even more contradictory ways; some theories
preempt all claims against applicators,13 while others preempt no claims
against applicators.14 Only one court applies Bates directly to applicator
cases, preempting claims that impose additional or different labeling
requirements on EPA approved labeling.15
This article begins by summarizing FIFRA provisions and EPA
regulations relevant to common law claims against applicators, including
pesticide labeling requirements16 and pesticide applicator certification
guidelines.17 Generally, courts have given only cursory attention to these
requirements in applicator cases,18 yet they provide valuable insight as to
FIFRA’s preemptory effect.19 This article then briefly recounts the

5. For a summary and statistics of the epidemic, see id.; see also America's bedbug invasion:
By the numbers, THE WEEK, July 26, 2010, http://theweek.com/article/index/205392/americasbedbug-invasion-by-the-numbers.
6. Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Fungicide Act, 7 U.S.C. 136 (2006); 61 Stat. 163 §
1 (1947) (“This Act may be cited as the “Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.”).
7. 7 U.S.C. 136v(b) (2006).
8. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
9. See infra SECTION III.C.
10. See infra SECTION III.C.
11. See infra SECTION IV.
12. See infra SECTION IV.
13. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
14. See infra SECTION IV.A.1.
15. See infra notes 167–89 and accompanying text.
16. See infra SECTION I.A.
17. See infra SECTION I.B.
18. See infra SECTION IV (discussing how courts have addressed this issue, almost none of
which discussed EPA regulations).
19. See infra SECTION V.A (discussing how Bates interacts with EPA regulations).
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preemption doctrine,20 before proceeding with an extensive analysis of
Supreme Court decisions interpreting FIFRA preemption.21 It then analyzes
cases from the state and federal levels that apply the FIFRA preemption
regime to common law claims against applicators.22 This section organizes
disparate decisions into the select modes of preemption, breaking analysis
first into express23 and implied24 preemption, and then into relevant
subparts. This article ends by concluding that the majority of courts fail to
consider a key element in the FIFRA regulatory scheme: EPA regulations
themselves.25 This analysis suggests FIFRA does preempt many common
law claims against applicators.26 While this is a proper extension of
administrative expertise, EPA should take additional precautions to guard
against unwarranted preemption of claims against applicators.27
I. FIFRA, EPA, AND STATE REQUIREMENTS ON PESTICIDE LABELING
AND APPLICATORS
A. Pesticide Label Requirements
To sell pesticides in the United States, manufacturers must comply
with FIFRA registration standards.28 Once approved, pesticide
manufactures must comply with EPA-imposed labeling requirements.29
Noncompliance is “unlawful.”30 Pertinent to the preemption debate, states
may not “impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required” under the
statute.31 Also, it is unlawful “to use any registered pesticide in a manner
inconsistent with its labeling.”32
20. See infra SECTION II.
21. See infra SECTION III.
22. See infra SECTION IV.
23. See infra SECTION IV.A.
24. See infra SECTION IV.B.
25. See infra SECTION V.
26. See infra SECTION V.
27. See infra SECTION V.
28. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006) (providing registration requirements for pesticide manufactures,
including submission of pesticide contents and proposed labeling); see also Ian M. Hughes,
Comment, Does FIFRA Level State Tort Claims for Inadequate Warning “Preempted?” Welcher
v. American Cyanamid, Inc., 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 316–17 (1996) (explaining various
registration procedures).
29. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E) (2006) (making it illegal to distribute or sell “any pesticide
which is adulterated or misbranded”); §136(q)(1)(E) (defining misbranding as, in part, “any word,
statement, or other information required by or under authority … [of FIFRA] to appear on the
label or labeling is not prominently placed thereon”).
30. Id. § 136j(a)(1)(E).
31. Id. § 136v(b).
32. Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G).
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FIFRA defines pesticide labels as “the written, printed, or graphic
matter on, or attached to, the pesticide or device or any of its containers or
wrappers.”33 Pesticide labels must specify “the name and percentage by
weight of each active ingredient,” and “the total percentage of weight of all
inactive ingredients.”34 Moreover, if the pesticide includes arsenic, the label
must include “a statement of the percentages of total and water-soluble
arsenic calculated as elemental arsenic.”35
A pesticide’s label must include whether the pesticide is classified as
restricted,36 its approved sites of application,37 the target pest of each site,38
and the method of application including dilution.39 Labels must also include
“[t]he frequency and timing of applications necessary to obtain effective
results without causing unreasonable adverse effects on the environment”40
and “[o]ther pertinent information which the Administrator determines to be
necessary for the protection of man and the environment.”41
Furthermore, EPA regulations provide standards for adequacy and
clarity of directions.42 First, directions must be written so that the average
person likely to use or supervise the use of the pesticide can understand
them.43 Second, and more importantly, “when followed, directions must be
adequate to protect the public from fraud and from personal injury and to
prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”44
B. Federal and State Pesticide Applicator Certification
Under the authority of FIFRA, EPA has imposed stringent
requirements on pesticide applicator certification.45 States may also create
certification programs so long that their regulations are at least as stringent
as the EPA regulations.46 Importantly, these applicator certification

33. Id. § 136(p)(1).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(g)(1) (2010).
35. Id. § 156.10(g)(1).
36. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(i).
37. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(iii).
38. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(iv).
39. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(vi).
40. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(vii).
41. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(x)(F).
42. Id. § 156.10(i)(1)(i).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 40 C.F.R. § 171 (2010).
46. Id.§ 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C). Since FIFRA’s preemption clause applies only to pesticide
labeling, the statute does not preempt state applicator certification requirements. See 7 U.S.C. §
136v(b) (2006) (preempting “additional or different” state labeling requirements).
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requirements may help assert a duty of care in state tort claims.47 For the
preemption question, the applicator certification requirements illustrate
knowledge that may give rise to “additional or different” general standards
of care and warnings than provided in EPA approved labeling.48
FIFRA defines a “certified applicator” as any individual who is
certified under the act to “use or supervise the use of any pesticide which is
classified as restricted use.”49 An individual who applies a restricted use
pesticide on property other than her own is a “commercial applicator,”50
while an applicator who applies a restricted use pesticide on her own
property is a “private applicator.”51A pesticide is considered applied under
the supervision of a certified applicator, even if the certificated application
is not present when the pesticide is applied.52
EPA does not require private applicators to take a test establishing
their competency to apply restricted use pesticides.53 However, commercial
applicators are subject to more stringent requirements.54 Section 136i
provides the EPA administrator can set certification requirements, which
implicitly include a training program.55 Most importantly, EPA has
authority to impose an examination requirement on commercial
applicators.56 Section 136i permits states to submit a certification plan to
the EPA for approval.57 In absence of an approved state plan, EPA takes
responsibility for certification.58
Pursuant to this authority, 40 C.F.R. § 171 delineates commercial
applicator certification requirements. Competency is determined by
47. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965) (“Unless he represents that
he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of
a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.”); id. § 288B(2)
(“The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is not so adopted may be relevant
evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.”); id. § 288C (“Compliance with a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a
reasonable man would take additional precautions.”).
48. See 40 C.F.R. §171.4(b)(1)(ii) (2010) (providing that commercial applicators must know
about pesticide application and dangers generally, in addition to label comprehension).
49. 7 U.S.C. § 136(e)(1) (2006).
50. Id. § 136(e)(3).
51. Id. § 136(e)(2).
52. Id. § 136(e)(4).
53. Id. § 136i(a)(1).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. § 136i(a)(2).
58. Id. § 136i(a)(1). As of 2004, EPA had 1,081,803 certified applicators on file. 1987-2004
Annual Certified Applicator Data, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/safety/applicators/data.htm
(last visited August 24, 2011).
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“examinations, and, as appropriate, performance testing.”59 All commercial
applicators must prove competence in certain base-line standards,60 while
different categories of commercial applicators also must prove competence
in specific standards.61
General areas of competency encompass label comprehension,62
various safety factors,63 and application techniques.64 Commercial
applicators must understand the format and terminology of pesticide
labeling,” including “instructions, warnings, terms symbols, and other
information appearing on pesticide labels.”65 They must also understand
that the pesticide must be applied in a manner consistent to its label.66
Required safety factors include “pesticide toxicity and hazard to man and
common exposure routes,” “common types and causes of pesticide
accidents,” and “precautions necessary to guard against injury to applicators
and other individuals in or near treat areas.”67 Lastly, applicators must
understand various procedures used to apply pesticides, along with which
application techniques to use in a given situation.68
Those applicators involved in “industrial, institutional, structural, and
health related pest control” must understand pesticide formulations
appropriate for various structural pests.69 They must also understand how to
“avoid contamination of food, damage and contamination of habitat, and
exposure of people and pets.”70 Furthermore, applicators must have a
practical understanding of what factors lead to dangerous conditions,
“including continuous exposure in the various situations encountered in this
category.”71
At their discretion, states may promulgate their own standards for
commercial applicator certification.72 State standards must be at least equal
to the standards promulgated by EPA under § 171.4(b).73 In Maryland,
applicators must have one year prior experience working for an applicator

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

40 C.F.R. §171.4(a) (2010).
Id. § 171.4(b).
Id. § 171.4(c).
Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(i).
Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(ii).
Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(vii).
Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(i).
Id.
Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(ii).
Id. § 171.4(b)(1)(vii).
Id. § 171.4(c)(7).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 171.7.
Id. § 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C).
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in the area in which she is seeking certification, obtain “a degree or
academic certificate” approved by the Maryland Department of Agriculture,
or accomplish a combination of both.74 Furthermore, applicants must score
70 percent or higher on their exams to obtain certification.75
II. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides:
[t]his Constitution and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or the Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.76
In light of this language, Congress has authority to use its delegated
powers to preempt state laws, even without conflict or invoking the
Supremacy Clause.77 Nevertheless, courts assume “the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless
[there is a] clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”78 Importantly, the
federal preemption doctrine applies to both state statutes and common
law.79 A state common law rule has the same preemptive effect as a state
statute.80
There are three modes of federal preemption. First, Congress may
“supplant state authority in a particular field . . . [through express] terms of
the statute.”81 Second, Congress may preempt an entire field by implication
if “the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for States to supplement it,’”82 or
where a Congressional enactment touches an area with a federal interest so
dominant that it precludes state law.83 Third, Congress may preempt by

74. MD. CODE REGS. 15.05.01.08 (2010).
75. Id. 15.05.01.09.
76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
77. Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (1998).
78. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
79. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (holding that state common law
claims are preempted by federal statute).
80. Id.
81. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604–05 (1991).
82. Id. at 605 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
83. See Jordan, supra note 77, at 1165.
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implication if “the state law actually conflicts with federal law,”84 such that
the state law imposes an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of
Congress85 or complying with both the federal and state standards is a
“physical impossibility.”86 While the Court recognizes that implied
preemption can exist independently of a statute’s express preemption, it is
not clear whether implied preemption should influence a court’s express
preemption analysis.87 Lastly, important to administrative law issues,
federal regulations are no less preemptive than federal statues.88
III. FIFRA PREEMPTION CASES: BUILDING UP TO BATES
Congress passed FIFRA in 1947 to protect consumers from defective
pesticides.89 However, due to burgeoning safety and environmental
concerns, in 1972 Congress passed extensive amendments expanding
FIFRA from a simple labeling law to an inclusive regulatory regime.90
Through these amendments, Congress gave EPA authority to regulate the
use, sale, and labeling of pesticides, as well as enforcement power.91 Most
importantly, however, these amendments require that states not create any
labeling requirements “in addition to or different from those required”
under the statute and its regulations.92 With little guidance on this
amendment, the Court began to interpret how this clause – and enhanced
EPA authority under FIFRA – interacts with the broader preemption
doctrine.93
A. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier: State Positive Law
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,94 the Court considered
whether FIFRA preempts local ordinances regulating pesticide use.95 The
84. Id.
85. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 605 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
86. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 142–43 (1963)).
87. See Jordan, supra note 77, at 1164–65 (“[T]he Court's recent cases have sent a mixed
message as to the extent to which the implied preemption doctrines should play a role in
construing express preemption provisions. The cases suggest that the Court as a whole agrees that
an express preemption provision does not foreclose consideration of the implied preemption
doctrines. However, not all of the Justices are ready for a wholesale incorporation of the doctrines
into a traditional express preemption analysis.”).
88. Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982)
(quoting U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
89. See Ian M. Hughes, supra note 28, at 315–16.
90. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 437 (2005) (quoting Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1994)).
91. Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991–92 (1994)).
92. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006).
93. See infra SECTION III.A–C.
94. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
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Court held FIFRA does not expressly or impliedly preempt state or local
level regulation of pesticides.96 The Court rejected the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s holding that § 136v and the provision’s legislative history
evidenced Congress’ preemptive intent.97 The ordinance, enacted by the
town of Casey, required a permit for pesticide application.98 Upon grant of
a permit, the ordinance required the permittee to display signs notifying the
public about the pesticide used and any labeling denoting a safe time to
reenter the area.99
The Court explained that § 136v(a) allows states to regulate the “use
and sale of pesticides” because it did not evidence Congress’ intent to
preempt local regulations.100 Reviewing the legislative history of the
provision, the Court concluded that while there are some hints that
Congress may have intended to preempt state regulations, the record fell
short of showing a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”101
Furthermore, the Court observed § 136v(b) would be surplusage if
Congressional intent was to capture all pesticide regulation.102 Thus, the
Court held that § 136v “plainly authorizes the ‘States’ to regulate pesticides
and just as plainly is silent to local governments.”103 There was little
evidence that FIFRA is a “comprehensive statute that occupied the field of
pesticide regulation.”104
B. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: A Shift (and Split) in the Preemption
Debate
Despite the Court’s holding in Mortier, the FIFRA preemption debate
shifted when the Court decided a case applicable specifically to labeling
requirements.105 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,106 the Court
considered whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965 preempted state common law requirements on cigarette labels.107 The

95. Id. at 600.
96. Id. at 606–08.
97. Id. at 607.
98. Id. at 602.
99. Id. at 603.
100. Id. at 610 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). If still
current doctrine, this would suggest state common law rules imposing additional application
techniques on applicators are never preempted. With Bates, however, this rule no longer stands.
101. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
102. Id. at 613.
103. Id. at 607.
104. Id at 612.
105. See infra notes 106–19 and accompanying text.
106. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
107. Id. at 508.
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preemption language of the statute reads, “[n]o requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect
to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
[lawfully] labeled.”108
The Court interpreted this provision as encompassing both positive
state enactments and common law rules because the provision is broad and
does not distinguish between positive state enactments and common law
rules.109 Because the Court read the “requirement or prohibition” language
to include common law rules, lower courts proceeded to interpret FIFRA’s
“requirements” provision in a similarly broad fashion.110 However, courts
disagreed over whether FIFRA expressly or impliedly preempted state
common law claims.111
For instance, the Eleventh Circuit concluded FIFRA expressly
preempts state common law claims against manufactures.112 The court
compared the requirements language of § 136v to the Cigarette Labeling
Act.113 Taking Cipollone into account, the court found the requirement
language does not manifest a Congressional intent to treat the preemption of
common law and state statutes differently.114 Accordingly, all common law
claims constituted requirements under the FIFRA provision and were
preempted.115
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit found FIFRA
impliedly preempts state common law claims against manufacturers.116 The
court based its reasoning on a conflict between the two laws and field
preemption.117 On the first point, the court reasoned that damages in state
court founded on failure to warn claims do constitute “ad hoc
determinations of the adequacy of statutory labeling standards,” hindering
the purpose of §136v(b): ensuring uniform labeling standards.118 On the
second point, the court reasoned that while the Supreme Court in Mortier
found FIFRA does not preempt state application requirements, “Congress

108. Id. at 515 (quoting Pub. L. 91-222, § 5b, Apr. 1, 1970).
109. Id. at 521.
110. Joseph Frueh, Comment, Pesticides, Preemption, and the Return of Tort Protection, 23
YALE J. REG. 299, 303 (2006).
111. See Hughes, supra note 28, at 325–30.
112. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 517 (11th Cir. 1993).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 518 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)).
115. Id.
116. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 164 (10th Cir.
1992).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 162.
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had impliedly preempted state regulation in the more narrow area of
labeling.”119
C. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Inc.: The Parallel Requirements Standard
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Inc.,120 the Supreme Court clarified the
FIFRA preemption doctrine – at least regarding manufactures – in favor of
express preemption.121 In Bates, farmers sued Dow Agrosciences, Inc.
(“Dow”) claiming that the company’s pesticide damaged their peanut
crop.122 The pesticide’s EPA approved label stated that it should be used
“in all areas where peanuts are grown.”123 The farmers claimed, however,
that Dow knew or should have known that the pesticide would harm
peanuts in soils over a 7-pH level.124 The farmers alleged strict liability,
negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas DTPA.125
After examining an “inducement” test applied by some courts,126 the
Court held § 136v(b) expressly preempts state-law labeling and packing
requirements “in addition to or different from” the labeling and packaging
requirements approved by the EPA.127 According to the Court’s reading of
the provision, there are two situations where state common law claims are
not preempted.
First, FIFRA preempts a state common law claim only if the claim
directly imposes labeling requirements.128 For instance, FIFRA does not
preempt rules requiring “manufacturers to design reasonably safe products,
to use due care in conducting appropriate testing of their products, to
market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their express
warranties or other contractual commitments” because they have nothing to
do with FIFRA pesticide labels.129 The mere fact that a state common law
119. Id. at 163 (emphasis in original). The court did not change its reasoning while considering
the case on remand after the Supreme Court decided Cipollone. The court did not consider EPA
regulations that require application standards on the labeling. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v.
Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We believe Congress
circumscribed the area of labeling and packaging and preserved it only for federal law.”).
120. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
121. Id. at 447.
122. Id. at 435.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 435–36.
126. Id. at 445–46. The “inducement” test was an effects-based test that presumed imposing
liability upon pesticide manufactures would induce them to change their labeling. Id. at 445. The
court critique this test, explaining it is “unquestionably overbroad because it would impeach many
“genuine design defect claims.” Id.
127. Id. at 447.
128. Id. at 444.
129. Id.
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claim of this kind may induce a pesticide manufacture to alter its label is
immaterial.130
Second, the Court held that certain state-law claims, such as failure-towarn, can impose labeling requirement if they claim the label included
misleading or inadequate warnings.131 The court explained, however, that §
136v(b) does not preempt these claims if the requirements and equivalent or
consistent with the FIFRA misbranding provisions.132 Furthermore, state
common law claims “need not explicitly incorporate FIFRA’s standards as
an element of a cause of action in order to survive pre-emption.”133
Importantly, the Court noted “[s]tate-law requirements must also be
measured against any relevant EPA regulations that give content to
FIFRA’s misbranding standards.”134 Thus, if an EPA regulation provides
guidelines for labeling requirements, a state court cannot create a
requirement inconsistent with the EPA guideline.135 To be sure, “a
manufacturer should not be held liable under a state labeling requirement
subject to § 136v(b) unless the manufacturer is also liable for misbranding
as defined by FIFRA.”136 This language is relevant to claims against
applicators because it connects a court imposed duty of care to EPA
labeling regulations.137 Nonetheless, courts have generally failed to
consider EPA regulations during FIFRA preemption analysis in applicator
cases.138
IV. PESTICIDE APPLICATORS AND THE POST-BATES PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Express Preemption: Stuck at “Step-One”
Bates clarified express preemption under FIFRA, at least as applied to
manufacturers.139 FIFRA preempts a state common law claim only if the
claim directly imposes labeling requirement and it is in additional to or

130. See id. at 445 (“[The] effects-based test finds no support in the text of § 136v(b), which
speaks only of ‘requirements.’”).
131. Id. at 446–47.
132. Id. at 447.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 453.
135. See id. (“For example, a failure-to-warn claim alleging that a given pesticide's label
should have stated “DANGER” instead of the more subdued “CAUTION” would be pre-empted
because it is inconsistent with 40 CFR § 156.64 (2004), which specifically assigns these warnings
to particular classes of pesticides based on their toxicity.”).
136. Id.
137. See infra SECTION V.
138. See infra SECTION IV.
139. See supra SECTION III.C.
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different from EPA approved labeling.140 However, applying this parallel
requirements test to common law claims against applicators is problematic
because it is not immediately clear how those claims invoke EPA labeling.
The express preemption debate thus centers on the first step of the Bates
test: do common law claims against applicators impose labeling
requirements at all? A survey of cases on the matter reveals three general
approaches to the issue. First, some courts have found that imposing
requirements on applicators in no way implicates FIFRA labeling
requirements.141 Second, some courts have found FIFRA preempts claims
against applicators in an almost blanket fashion.142 Third, some courts have
found FIFRA preempts claims against applicators under more nuisance
terms.143 Courts, including the one post-Bates federal district court to
consider this issue, have generally not considered state common law claims
against “any relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s
misbranding standards.”144
1. Preemption Not Possible: No Connection
At least two courts have found FIFRA labeling requirements do not
implicate claims against applicators.145 Nevertheless, these courts have
reached the same result with different logic, focusing on a lack of an
affirmative labeling requirement and the purpose of EPA labeling.146
Neither court considered the content of EPA promulgated labeling
regulations.147
The Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that, since FIFRA does not
create an affirmative labeling requirement for applicators, it does not
preempt any common law failure to warn claims against pesticide
applicators.148 The court explained that while FIFRA does require pesticide
manufactures to attach EPA-approved labels to their products in order to
sell them, FIFRA does not require applicators to label anything.149 Thus,
due to the lack of an affirmative labeling requirement on applicators, the
court found the tort claim does not impose “a requirement additional to or
different from those imposed by FIFRA.”150 Importantly, this presumption
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See supra SECTION III.C.
See infra SECTION IV.A.1.
See infra SECTION IV.A.2.
See infra SECTION IV.A.3.
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005).
See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind. 2001).
Id.
Id.
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against preemption applies independently of a common law claim’s
differences with EPA approved labeling.151
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion when finding a New
York pesticide notification program was not preempted by FIFRA, but
focused on the purpose of the labeling requirements rather than an
affirmative duty to label the pesticide.152 A New York statute required
applicators to provide their customers with a list of applied chemicals, the
EPA’s approved label, and a cover sheet including additional warnings and
safety information than provided on EPA labeling.153
The court focused on the purpose of the two requirements. On one
hand, FIFRA labeling “is designed to be read and followed by the end user.
Generally, it is conceived as being attached to the immediate container of
the product in such a way that it can be expected to remain affixed during
the period of use.”154 On the other hand, the target audience of the state
notification program are members of the public or individuals who
contracted for pesticide application who enter areas where pesticides –
often strong poisons – have been applied.155 Thus, the court reasoned, the
state notification requirement does not impose additional requirements upon
the EPA label because its purpose – warning the innocent public – dose not
address the purpose of FIFRA labeling requirements: informing
applicators.156 As a result, the court did not discuss the § 136v(b)
prohibition against “additional or different” labeling requirements in
relation to the New York law requirement that applicators provide
additional safety information than on EPA labeling.157
2. Preemption Possible: No Explanation
The majority of courts have found FIFRA can preempt claims against
applicators, but do not explain why.158 Prior to Bates, many courts held
FIFRA preempts common law claims against applicators in a seemingly
blanket fashion and did not consider how tort claims against applicators

151. See id. (explaining that this theory draws from the lack of affirmative labeling
requirements on pesticide applicators). Furthermore, the court did not find most applicator cases
persuasive because they failed to consider this distinction. Id.
152. New York State Pesticide Coal., Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1989).
153. Id. at 116–17.
154. Id. at 119.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.; 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006).
158. According to my calculations, approximately 63 percent of the courts cited in this article
found preemption but did not explain why.
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interact with EPA labeling regulations.159 However, these cases may fall in
line with a Cipollone-based notion that any mention of FIFRA labeling –
even parroting EPA-approved labeling – automatically led to
preemption.160 Even so, other courts completely skirted this issue under the
theory that the plaintiffs’ claims merely involved a duty to warn of dangers
printed on the label. Thus, under no formulation of the preemption doctrine
could they impose additional or different requirements.161
3. Preemption Possible: Explained
Some courts have found FIFRA can preempt claims against
applicators and have explained their logic.162 However, their reasoning
ranges from a lack of a duty to warn within EPA-approved pesticide
labeling to an applicator’s reliance on the labeling.163 Furthermore, these
cases give only a cursory reading (if any) to EPA promulgated labeling
requirements.164
One district court viewed the requirement of an affirmative duty to
warn as imposing additional requirements upon EPA labels because EPA
labels do not specify a duty to warn.165 As the court explained, “[t]he
practical effect of permitting a jury to return a verdict against a defendant
who has complied with the federal labeling requirements for violation of a
159. See Hottinger v. Trugreen Corp., 665 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining
the “broad prohibition imposed by FIFRA against state regulation of warning labels on hazardous
substances bars common-law liability attempts to impose liability on top of that provided by
federal laws” without explaining how the principle applies to pesticide applicators); King v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F.Supp. 1030, 1037 (D. Me. 1992) (finding that FIFRA preempts
strict liability and negligence claims “for defective warnings or the failure to warn of the hazards
associated with the products subject to regulation under the Act”); Tyler v. Dow Chem. Co. Inc.,
683 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620–22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (explaining that FIFRA preempts common law
claims against applicators, but not explaining its logic).
160. See Frueh, supra note 110, at 302–04.
161. Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“Recognition of this
‘failure-to-warn’ claim does not conflict with FIFRA's prohibition of state labeling or packaging
requirements because the defendant's liability is unrelated to the manner in which the product is
labeled or packaged. Under plaintiffs' theory, liability attaches as a result of defendant's failure to
relay the warning that FIFRA requires sellers to affix to their product.”); see also Dow Chem. Co.
v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. 2001) (“We hold that FIFRA preemption does
not apply to preclude the plaintiff’s action against … [the defendant] for its failure to warn the
plaintiffs by providing them with the FDA-approved [sic] labeling information.”); Eyl v. CibaGeigy Corp., 650 N.W.2d 744, 758 (Neb. 2002) (“[T]he applicators are simply being required in
their use of the product to relay information to additional people.”); Pisano v. Budget Termite, No.
551800, 2000 WL 226425 at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2000) (“Where the claim is merely
failure to convey any warnings contained in the label then FIFRA is not implicated.”).
162. See infra notes 165–89 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 165–89 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 165–89 and accompanying text.
165. Watson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17607 at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 8,
1988).
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common law duty to warn would be to require the defendant to provide
warnings different than those required by the federal label.”166 This has
broad reach, preempting any claim not based on an explicit warning
requirement in the pesticide’s labeling.
Another district court found FIFRA preempts common law claims
against applicators based on the applicator’s reliance on the pesticide
labeling.167 This case is of particular importance because it is the only postBates court to decide this issue. In Morgan v. Powe Timber Company,168
eighty-one plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful death and personal
injuries they claimed resulted from the defendant’s treated wood product.169
The defendants owned the treated wood processing facility and, in that
capacity, applied pesticide to wood.170 The defendants, in their motion for
summary judgment, claimed the FIFRA preempted plaintiff’s failure to
warn claim.171 The plaintiffs, in response, claimed that “FIFRA preemption
extends only to manufacturers, sellers and distributors of EPA-registered
pesticides,”172 pointing to various cases where courts did not find FIFRA
preempts claims that applicators failed to convey information printed on
EPA approved labels.173 The plaintiffs also asserted that EPA approved
labeling for the pesticides in question warned of skin and fume exposure.174
After summarizing the holding of Bates,175 the court explained FIFRA
preemption analysis focuses on whether the legal duty imposed creates a
state law requirement to provide information in addition to or different from
the label, rather than on whom the state law imposes the duty.176
Connecting common law requirements on applicators to FIFRA labeling
requirements, the court noted that FIFRA gives manufactures the duty to
register its pesticides with EPA for approval.177 Importantly, applicators
can rely to the same extent as distributors or sellers on the manufacturer’s
labels because the labels have satisfied the rigorous label approval
process.178 There is no need for applicators to research the accuracy of
individual labels when they are in the worst position to access that
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Morgan v. Powe Timber Company, 367 F.Supp.2d 1032 (S.D. Miss. 2005).
367 F.Supp.2d 1032 (S.D. Miss. 2005).
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1042–43.
Id. at 1043–44.
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
Id. (quoting Taylor AG Industries v. Pure–Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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information.179 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
applicator claims are not preempted, reasoning that all the claims cited by
the plaintiff did not impose requirements in addition to or different from
EPA imposed labeling requirements.180
Having established that claims against applicators implicate labeling
requirements, the court then moved to the defendant’s primary preemption
argument.181 Namely, since the EPA approved label does not warn against
burning wood treated by the pesticide, any common law requirement for
failure to warn of such a danger – even upon applicators – would impose
“addition or different” labeling requirements.182 In response, the plaintiff
presented evidence that many EPA approved labels for the pesticide in
question included warnings about skin absorption and even the dangers of
exposure to fumes.183 Parsing this evidence, the court rejected the
defendants’ claim that FIFRA preempted plaintiff’s failure to convey EPAapproved handling instructions for chemically treated wood products.184
According to the court, FIFRA does not preempt failure to convey claims
regarding the contents of EPA approved labels; FIFRA, however, does
preempt claims involving additional or different requirements than EPA
approved labels.185
While the court’s application of the basic Bates preemption doctrine is
relatively straightforward,186 its connection between applicator common
law claims and EPA labeling requirements is undeveloped.187 In fact, the
court does not articulate how this EPA labeling regulations can invoke the
FIFRA preemption provision.188 In SECTION V, this article contends Bates
fully supports such a connection.189

179. Id. (quoting Taylor AG Industries v. Pure–Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560–63 (9th Cir. 1995)).
180. Id. at 1043–44.
181. See infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 1044.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1045.
185. See id. (concluding that FIFRA never preempts failure to convey claims, but not
precluding the possibility that FIFRA preempts failure to warn claims imposing additional or
different labeling requirements).
186. See id. (applying the Bates “additional or different” test).
187. See id. (finding that preemption is possible, but not discussing EPA labeling
requirements).
188. See id. (discussing the possibility of preemption without analyzing how EPA labeling
requirements interact with the FIFRA preemption provision).
189. See infra SECTION V.

BEUGELMANS - Vol 14 Website Final

2011]

THE FEDERALISM OF CLIMEX LECTULARIUS

S-75

B. Implied Preemption: An Unworkable Defense
It is possible, but extremely unlikely, that FIFRA preemption of claims
against applicators exists independently of the express preemption regime
established in Bates.190 The Supreme Court allows implied preemption
claims even if an express preemption claim exists for another portion of a
statute.191 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court held in Mortier that
FIFRA does not impliedly preempt all state labeling requirements, it did not
specifically address applicator claims.192 Thus, FIFRA can preempt
common law claims against applicators under a theory of implied
preemption, even if a court does not find FIFRA and EPA regulations
adequately connect labeling requirements and the conduct of applicators.193
However, as the discussion below reveals, it is very difficult or even
impossible to raise an implied preemption defense under FIFRA.
1. Field Preemption
a. Pervasive Regulatory Scheme
Congress may preempt an entire field by implication if “Congress
intended the federal government to occupy [the field] exclusively.”194
There is no exact measure for when a regulatory scheme is comprehensive
enough to imply preemption.195 However, the Court has found implied
preemption both where, in addition to an extensive regulatory scheme,
federal interest in regulation is low.196 The Court has paid particular
attention to the regulation of “minutiae” – whether the federal regulatory
program is so pervasive that it regulates down to the most specific aspects

190. See infra notes 191–247 and accompanying text.
191. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288–89 (1995) (allowing an implied
preemption defense even though the requirements for a judicially established express preemption
defense were not met).
192. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611–12 (1991) (finding FIFRA
does not broadly preempt state claims against applicators).
193. This is an ideal claim in jurisdictions that find “no connection” between applicators and
labeling requirements. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ind.
2001) (noting the lack of an affirmative notification requirement on applicators); New York State
Pesticide Coal, 874 F.2d at 119 (noting the difference of audience between pesticide labeling and
general warnings to the public).
194. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1165.
195. Id. at 1168.
196. Compare Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 688890 (1965) (noting the pervasive features of a federal government regulatory program that
arguably dealt with a strong federal interest – trade with Native Americans), with Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 169 (1942) (noting the pervasive features of a federal
government regulatory program in an area of low federal interest: butter regulation).
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of the field.197 Nonetheless, the Court views pervasive administrative
regulations with reluctance because agencies deal with issues in much
greater detail than Congress, greatly increasing the likelihood of preemption
under the non-administrative standard.198
Focusing on this issue, the Indiana Supreme Court held FIFRA does
not preempt claims against applicators via a pervasive regulatory
scheme.199 It explained FIFRA allows states in some instances to regulate
pesticides, noting the act provides ample room for States and localities to
supplement federal regulatory efforts even without the express
authorization of §136v(a).200 Relying on Mortier,201 the court reasoned that
“like a state or local regulatory scheme that requires permits and notice to
the non-user consumer/bystander and imposes penalties, the imposition of a
duty to warn on applicators is not preempted by FIFRA.”202
In the end, courts are simply reluctant to find implied preemption from
the extent of administrative regulations.203 Since modern regulatory
legislation is necessarily complex, with Congress not always intending such
legislation to be preemptive, it is unlikely a court would view extensive
FIFRA regulations as impliedly preempting common law claims against
applicators.204

197. See Warren Trading Post, 380 U.S. at 688–90 (“The Commissioner has promulgated
detailed regulations prescribing in the most minute fashion who may qualify to be a trader and
how he shall be licensed; penalties for acting as a trader without a license; conditions under which
government employees may trade with Indians; articles that cannot be sold to Indians; and
conduct forbidden on a licensed trader's premises.”); Cloverleaf Butter, 315 U.S. at 168 (1942)
(“By the statutes and regulations, the Department of Agriculture has authority to watch the
consumer's interest throughout the process of manufacture and distribution. It sees to the
sanitation of the factories in such minutiae as the clean hands of the employees and the
elimination of objectionable odors, inspects the materials used, including air for aerating the oils
and confiscates the finished product when materials which would be unwholesome if utilized are
present after manufacture.”).
198. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717
(1985).
199. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 639-40 (Ind. 2001).
200. Id. at 640.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Hillsborough County, Fla., 471 U.S. at 717 (noting the Court’s skepticism towards the
extent of administrative regulations in preemptions cases).
204. See New York State Dept. of Soc. Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) (“[T]he
subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature require intricate and
complex responses from the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment
as the exclusive means of meeting the problem.”).
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b. Dominant Federal Interest
Congress may preempt an entire field where its enactment touches an
area with a federal interest so dominant that it precludes state law.205
Dominant federal interest field preemption requires an issue greater than a
mere federal interest because almost every topic subject to Congressional
action is a national issue.206 For instance, the Court has found a dominant
federal interest in alien registration because of the national government’s
traditional role in international affairs.207 Additionally, the Court balances
federal and state interest by analyzing the history of state and federal
regulation, as well as the regulatory scheme as a whole.208
No courts, federal or state, have considered this type of preemption
defense in a pesticide applicator case.209 Ironically, this defense may
operate identically to a defense under FIFRA’s express preemption
language.210 Commercial concerns suggest a dominant federal interest in
regulating the contents of pesticide labels.211 The federal government
working alone can impose uniform labeling requirements, while states
operating separately would impose many different labeling requirements,
unjustifiably burdening pesticide manufactures.212 State common law
claims that require a different standard of care than on EPA-approved
labeling disrupt this uniformity, implying EPA was abusing its discretion by
requiring a specific standard of care on the product’s label to fulfill its
labeling regulations.213 Thus, the dominant federal interest in uniform
labeling requirements is implicated by imposing additional or different
standards of care upon pesticide applicators.214

205. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1165.
206. Id. at 1166.
207. Hines v. Davidowitz, 323 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941).
208. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1168.
209. However, courts have discussed the matter in regards to manufactures. See Ciba-Geigy
Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 144 (Ark. 1992) (examining preemption of claims against
manufactures and explaining that “[t]he adoption of Section 136v(a) demonstrates that the scheme
created by FIFRA is not so pervasive or the federal interest so dominant as to demonstrate an
intent to preempt state tort claims”).
210. See infra notes 211–219 and accompanying text (explaining how this theory operates, in
the end imposing the same standard as FIFRA’s express preemption clause).
211. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005) (discussing the danger of
multiple state labeling requirements).
212. Id. (“In the main, [§ 136v(b)] preempts competing state labeling standards—imagine 50
different labeling regimes prescribing the color, font, size, and wording of warnings—that would
create significant inefficacies for manufacturers.”).
213. This argument mirrors the argument for applicator preemption under Bates. See infra
SECTION V.A.
214. For a full explanation of how EPA labeling regulations preempt claims against
applicators, see infra SECTION V.A.

BEUGELMANS - Vol 14 Website Final

S-78

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 14:Supp.

Similarly, a dominant federal interest may extend from the relative
expertise of EPA in developing a standard of care for pesticide
applicators.215 As Justice Breyer explains in his concurring opinion in
Bates, “the federal agency charged with administering the statute is often
better able than are courts to determine the extent to which state liability
rules mirror or distort federal requirements.”216 Since EPA is a national
agency charged with approving application standards included in pesticide
labeling,217 it is in the best position to determine what conduct should be
able to undergird a negligence claim, thus preempting state common law
claims.218, However, FIFRA would not preempt common law claims
mirroring EPA-approved standards of care because they do not implicate
the federal interest in uniform labeling,219
2. Conflict Preemption
As discussed earlier, Congress may preempt by implication if “state
and federal law actually conflict,”220 such that the state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and
objectives of Congress”221 or complying with both the federal and state
standards is a “physical impossibility.”222 Courts rarely struggle with the
later point because such cases normally involve state laws that allow an act
prohibited by federal law – a fairly obvious physical impossibility.223
The former method of preemption, however, presents more of a
challenge. In these instances, the courts must determine, based on how the
law is applied rather than written, whether the State law presents an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ objectives.224 Under this
inquiry, while it may be possible for parties to comply with both a state and

215. See Bates, 554 U.S. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining EPA may be in the best
position to address the extent to which FIFRA preempts state law).
216. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
217. See infra SECTION I (outlining EPA’s authority under FIFRA).
218. See Bates, 554 U.S. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he federal agency charged with
administering the statute is often better able than are courts to determine the extent to which state
liability rules mirror or distort federal requirements.”).
219. In the end, this functionally mirrors the operative effect of Bates’ express preemption
language. See infra SECTION V.A.
220. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991).
221. Id.
222. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 (1963).
223. Jordan, supra note 77, at 1171.
224. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 323
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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federal law, the state law conflicts with an essential federal purpose behind
the regulation.225
One district court explained that allowing common law claims against
applicators does not frustrate what it determined is FIFRA’s underlying
purpose: “that non-uniform requirements by states would burden interstate
trade of pesticides.”226 Under this logic, successful plaintiffs would only
encourage compliance with state pesticide use and sale regulations, rather
than induce sellers to alter their labeling.227 Furthermore, the Indiana
Supreme Court explained the purpose of FIFRA is not frustrated by
requiring applicators to convey warnings because the requirement promotes
rather than frustrates FIFRA’s objectives and does not burden applicator
compliance with FIFRA..228
It is important to note, however, that these two courts were considering
failure to relay already established EPA labeling warnings, not additional or
different warnings.229 Legislative history suggests Congress, via § 136v(b),
directly aimed to preempt additional applicator requirements imposed by
state pesticide programs existing at the time Congress passed FIFRA.230 As
Representative Helstoski explained during floor debate, “[t]he preemption
of State authority . . . seems to be clearly aimed at the heart of these strong
State programs. If one examines the history of this bill as it moved through
markup in committee, it seems apparent that this gutting of strong State
programs is intentional.”231 He further explained that the preemption
language was designed to prevent states from creating more tightly
regulated pesticides that required the written approval of a “Pest
Management Specialist” before use.232 This limitation was of particular
concern because the House during markup had removed a provision for
“use by permit only” pesticides applicable only by “Pest Management
Specialists.”233 Thus, if the purpose of the FIFRA preemption language was
specifically added to prohibit state requirements on applicators, then
225. See id. (holding a state flour weight labeling requirement preempted by federal law
because, while it would have been possible to comply with both laws, doing so would conflict
with a main purpose behind the federal law: uniform labeling for easy product comparison).
226. Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568, 578 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
227. Id.
228. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ebling ex rel. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. 2001).
229. Id. (holing that FIFRA preemption does not apply instances where an applicator failed to
provide a copy of the pesticide labeling); see Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568, 578
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that the plaintiff’s claim does not involve additional or different warnings
than as contained in the label).
230. See 117 Cong. Rec. 40034 (1971) (discussing FIFRA’s preemptive intent regarding state
pesticide programs).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 40035.
233. Id.
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additional state common law claims frustrate this purpose. It is worth
remembering, however, the considerable debate surrounding the
authoritative strength of legislative history.234
3. Administrative Intent to Preempt
If an agency intends its regulations to preempt state law and it acts
within the scope of its delegated authority, it can impliedly preempt
common law claims.235 More specifically, a court should not disturb an
applicator’s choice if it is a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies delegated to the agency, unless the statute or its legislative history
evidence that the accommodation is not sanctioned by Congress.236
Furthermore, the force of preemptive regulation is not contingent upon
express congressional authorization to preempt state law.237
The Federal Register reveals EPA promulgated many FIFRA labeling
requirements in response to the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control
Act of 1972,238 which changed the focus of pesticide regulation from
labeling verification to public health and environmental concerns.239 EPA
promulgated the labeling requirements with the intent that they would
provide “restrictions appropriate to the nature and degree of hazard posed
by a particular pesticide use.”240 Additionally, EPA designed the
regulations to “assure that human health and the environment are not
exposed to unreasonable risk”241 and “to improve the quality of labels in
terms of communication to pesticide users by grouping required
precautionary statements together.”242 Similar to the dominant federal
interest argument,243 this may fall in with Justice Breyer’s reasoning that

234. See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005) (discussing the use of
legislative history generally); Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive
Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative
State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 824-25 (2010) (discussing the use of legislative history as applied to
administrative law).
235. Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982).
236. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961).
237. Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 154.
238. 39 Fed. Reg. 36973 (Oct. 16, 1974). The notice of final rulemaking reveals EPA made
few changes to the final rule, including the essential language currently at 40 C.F.R. §
156.10(i)(1)(i) (directions for use). 40 Fed. Reg. 28242, 28252 (July 3, 1975).
239. Marina M. Lolley, Comment, Carcinogen Roulette: The Game Played Under Fifra, 49
MD. L. REV. 975, 978 (1990).
240. 39 Fed. Reg. 36974 (Oct. 16, 1974).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See infra SECTION IV.B.1.b.
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EPA is in the best position to determine the appropriate standard of care for
pesticide application.244 EPA may be exercising this authority.
Nevertheless, EPA has not explicitly stated its intent to preempt state
requirements.245 Furthermore, even if FIFRA does preempt state-level
requirements on pesticide applicators, there is no indication of intent to
preempt common law tort claims through depriving them of redress.246
Other portions of FIFRA also complicate this claim, allowing states to
create their own requirements for pesticide applicator certification, in effect
creating greater standards of care for pesticide applicators.247 Taken as a
whole, these considerations prove fatal to preemption through
administrative intent.
V. PREEMPTION, ADMINISTRATIVE FEDERALISM, AND SOME SUGGESTIONS
In his Bates concurrence, Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of
EPA expertise in lieu of FIFRA’s preemption language.248 As Justice
Breyer explained:
the federal agency charged with administering the statute
is often better able than are courts to determine the extent
to which state liability rules mirror or distort federal
requirements. Thus, the EPA may prove better able than
are courts to determine whether general state tort liability
rules simply help to expose new dangers associated with
pesticides or instead bring about a counterproductive
crazy-quilt of anti-misbranding requirements.249
Because FIFRA may preempt certain common law claims against
pesticide applicators, with EPA effectively creating a nationwide standard
of care for pesticide application, EPA should take the preemptive effect of
its regulations into account when promulgating future FIFRA labeling

244. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454-55 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
245. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 702 (1984) (finding the FCC
determined the preemptive effect of its regulations on state level telecommunications regulations
via express purpose).
246. See Hardin v. BASF Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43112, *9 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 15, 2005)
(holding tort actions in pesticide drift claims are not preempted by FIFRA because the court was
“without evidence that the EPA intended its regulations regarding spray drift to prohibit state law
claims seeking compensation for property damage caused by off-target drift”).
247. See 40 C.F.R. § 171.7 (2010) (establishing standards for state certification programs).
248. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454-55 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 455 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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regulations and approving new or altered pesticide labeling.250 With
adequate safeguards, FIFRA preemption in applicator cases is an
appropriate use of administrative expertise, aligning the scope of FIFRA
preemption to the federalism concerns of the Bates Court.251 This section
first describes how Bates opens the door for preemption of common law
claims against pesticide applicators.252 It then outlines a few basic
precautionary measures for EPA against unnecessary preemption, briefly
considering administrative federalism issues.253
A. Preempting Claims Against Pesticide Applicators
Bates lays the groundwork for preemption of certain state common law
claims against pesticide applicators,254 although the decision affects general
negligence and negligent failure to warn claims differently.255 In Bates, the
Court noted § 136v pre-empts positive or common law rules that impose
labeling requirements different than those provided in FIFRA and its
regulations.256 To this end, courts must weigh state law requirements
against “any relevant EPA regulations that give content to FIFRA’s
misbranding standards.”257 As an example, “[a] failure-to-warn claim
alleging that a given pesticide’s label should have stated ‘DANGER’
instead of the more subdued ‘CAUTION’ would be pre-empted because it
is inconsistent with 40 CFR § 156.64 (2004), which specifically assigns
these warnings to particular classes of pesticides based on their toxicity.”258
Thus, the focus is not on what a state law specifically requires a label to

250. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721
(1985) (explaining that, as summarized by Justice Breyer in his Bates concurrence, agencies “can
be expected to monitor, on a continuing basis, the effects on the federal program of local
requirements”).
251. Bates does not recognize the pesticide market as more appropriate for the decentralized
tort process than federal administrative control. While Bates does limit the extent of preemption, it
only does so to the logical contours of EPA’s expertise. Indeed, while state tort does create a
“counterbalance as the profit motive urges manufacturers to introduce new, potentially harmful
products,” EPA control of such claims goes further by replacing judicial variability with
administrative certainty. Furthermore, I disagree that state courts are an appropriate forum for
pesticide manufactures and applicators to realize the “social costs” of their potentially deadly
products. See Frueh, supra note 110, at 308–09 (explaining that pesticide tort claims are not
suitable for wide-scale federal control and advocating market efficiency through the adjudication
of injuries).
252. See infra SECTION V.A.
253. See infra SECTION V.B.
254. See infra notes 256–60 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 261–68 and accompanying text.
256. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005).
257. Id. at 453.
258. Id.
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include.259 Instead, preemption arises whenever a state common law claim
is additional to or different from what EPA required on the label to fulfill its
labeling regulations.260
Under this logic, FIFRA preempts general negligence claims in a
relatively straightforward fashion. Pursuant to EPA regulations, the label,
when followed, must be adequate to protect the public from personal
injury.261 Therefore, if a state common law claim against an applicator
holds she should have followed different conduct than the standard of care
required on the label, the state court is creating a standard different than
what EPA determined is required by its labeling regulations. In essence,
EPA, pursuant to its regulations, has determined the label is sufficient to
protect the public. The single, adequate standard of care for application of
the pesticide must be on the label and EPA is charged with authority to
determine this standard of application. State courts cannot impose a
different standard of care because, pursuant to the EPA regulations, that
standard should be included on the labeling.262
Taking into account additional regulations, claims an applicator was
negligent for applying a pesticide to a particular site263 or diluting the
pesticide in a certain way264 are preempted by FIFRA if they are
“additional or different” than what EPA determined satisfied the labeling
regulations. In fact, since the label must include “[o]ther pertinent
information which the Administrator determines to be necessary for the
protection of man and the environment,”265 arguably any other standard of
application apart from those listed on the label are preempted.
Bates has a slightly different effect on negligent failure to warn claims.
On one hand, the CFR does not impose an outright verbal warning,
suggesting additional or different warnings cannot invoke EPA
promulgated labeling requirements.266 Without an EPA promulgated
regulation explicitly requiring specific warnings based on specific criteria, a
common law duty to provide warnings in no way conflicts with EPA
259. See id. at 443 (noting the Court of Appeals correctly held “that the term ‘requirements’ in
§ 136v(b) reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to embrace
common-law duties.”).
260. See id. at 453 (explaining that “a state-law labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent
to a requirement under FIFRA to survive-preemption”).
261. 40 C.F.R. 156.10(i)(1)(i) (2010).
262. See id. § 156.10(i)(1)(i) (“When followed, directions must be adequate to protect the
public from fraud and from personal injury and to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment.”).
263. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(iii).
264. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(vi).
265. Id. § 156.10(i)(2)(x)(F).
266. See generally id. § 156.10 (providing labeling requirements, but not providing an
affirmative warning requirement).
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standards.267 On the other hand, EPA labeling requirements use broad
enough language that imposing additional or different warning
requirements can fall within their authority. For instance, EPA can interpret
the statutory provision that “directions must be adequate to protect the
public . . . from personal injury” to require an affirmative warning upon
application.268 Thus, the statute arguably preempts additional or different
warning requirements.269
B. A Few Suggestions
In the end, while Bates does extend preemption to claims against
pesticide applicators in certain circumstances,270 EPA can limit the extent
these regulations interfere with state regulation.271 At the same time, EPA
can also ensure that commercial applicators are held a standard equal to that
created by the federal and state certification requirements.272
Administrative agencies have expertise in technical fields that courts
do not.273 Furthermore, Congress often leaves broad discretion to
administrative agencies, both purposefully and inadvertently, in order to
administer a “statute in light of everyday realities.”274 Recognizing this
role, courts typically afford administrative agencies wide latitude in
technical determinations within their regulatory field.275 While there is
considerable scholarly debate as to how much deference courts should
afford agencies in the absence of an express preemption clause,276 FIFRA

267. See supra SECTION I.A (discussing EPA labeling regulations under FIFRA, none of which
include an affirmative duty to warn).
268. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(i)(1)(i).
269. Alarmingly, this theory means that a pesticide applicator can never be held liable for
failure to warn unless EPA imposes an explicit requirement via its regulations. See supra notes
266–68 and accompanying text.
270. See supra SECTION V.A.
271. See infra notes 297–308 and accompanying text.
272. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
273. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984).
274. Id. at 865–66.
275. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983) (“When examining … [a] scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322
U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (“In making [the NLRB’s] determinations as to the facts in these matters
conclusive, if supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily the decision whether the
evidence establishes the material facts. Hence in reviewing the Board's ultimate conclusions, it is
not the court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board's, when the latter have
support in the record.”).
276. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741–42
(2004) (“Although the political accountability of agencies for considering state interests is not
significantly inferior to that of Congress … Chevron deference to agency interpretations of the
preemptive effect of statutes is nonetheless inappropriate.”).
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includes such a clause.277 Bates dictates the scope of this clause,278
allowing EPA to determine its preemptive effect.279
While the outcome of administrative implied preemption cases rests
more heavily on a judicial balancing act between federal and state interests,
courts apply with express preemption.280 In these cases, “the outcome
frequently turns on the resolution of statutory ambiguities such as whether
state law can be said to ‘relate to’ a subject covered by federal law or to
impose a ‘requirement’ or ‘standard’ subject to federal control.”281 This
analysis “includes, at least implicitly, an evaluation of the real-world impact
of state regulation on maintaining a national commercial market.”282 In
Bates, the Court drew “a conceptual wedge between liability standards and
remedies,”283 preempting liability standards inconsistent with those created
by the EPA, but not preempting state created remedies. This may stem from
the court’s general unwillingness to leave injured citizen without redress.284
Still, the Bates Court did nothing to prevent what is, under the current
EPA regulations, both a preemptive ceiling and floor. Preemptive floors
create a federal baseline standard, with states able to create more stringent
standards.285 FIFRA regulations create a preemptive floor by allowing
states to promulgate certification requirements at least as stringent as EPA
requirements.286 Alternatively, preemptive ceilings completely preclude
more stringent state regulation, but allow less stringent state regulations.287
277. 7 U.S.C. § 136(v)(b) (2010). Even if Bates did not extend preemption to applicator
claims, EPA could arguably extend the scope of FIFRA through an interpretive rule, entitling the
agency to Chevron deference. See Mendelson, supra note 276, at 753 (noting “the agency might
interpret the scope of an express preemption clause to, say, preempt state statutory law but not
state tort law. The relevant agency interpretations are those eligible for Chevron deference – hence
those reached in a rulemaking or formal adjudication”).
278. See supra SECTION III.C.
279. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 455 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(examining how the majority’s holding allows EPA to determine the preemptive effect of its
regulations).
280. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 744
(2008).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 470 (2008).
284. Id. at 471 (“Viewed from [a] remedial vantage point, Bates seems to settle comfortably
within a wider pattern in the Court's general unwillingness, in the products liability realm, to leave
injured citizens without any remedy whatsoever.”).
285. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1558 (2007).
286. See 40 C.F.R. § 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C) (2010) (“[State commercial application requirements]
shall conform and be at least equal to those prescribed in § 171.4 for the various categories of
applicators utilized by the State.”).
287. Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1558.
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Through its “additional or different” preemption language, FIFRA operates
as a preemptive ceiling by preventing states from imposing more stringent
standards for pesticide labeling and application.288 FIFRA also operates as
a preemptive floor by preventing less stringent standards.289 These types of
preemption regimes typically benefit target industries.290 However,
preemptive ceilings may threaten the federal system.291 To be sure, the
“new unitary federal choice preemption . . . threatens to displace completely
state and local legal developments and the benefits of intersystemic
interaction inherent in federalist schemes.”292
This dual floor and ceiling means that plaintiffs injured by pesticides
may be without redress afforded by a jury verdict. Since EPA applicator
certification standards require that applicators understand “precautions
necessary to guard against injury to applicators and other individuals in or
near treatment areas,”293 commercial applicators are required to have the
capacity to follow a standard of care higher than included on pesticide
labeling.294 Nevertheless, while “[t]he state-law requirement need not be
phrased in the identical language of its corresponding FIFRA
requirement,”295 a plaintiff who seeks to hold an applicator to a higher
standard of care than required by a pesticide’s label may find herself unable
to receive compensation.296
One way to prevent this sort of unnecessary preemption is through
label-by-label analysis. EPA can scrutinize labels for unjust preemptive
effects.297 Through adopting a new procedural rule, it can attempt to
provide the most comprehensive list of proper application techniques
possible, making it less likely that a plaintiff may try to impose a
requirement that is not offered on the label. While EPA must already
determine that its labeling when followed is adequate to protect the public

288. See supra SECTION III.C (examining the holding of Bates preempting additional or
different state labeling requirements, including implicitly more stringent standards).
289. Id.
290. Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1590
291. Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1556.
292. Id.
293. 40 C.F.R. §171.4(b)(1)(ii)(c) (2010).
294. See, e.g., Johnson v. County Arena, Inc., 349 A.2d 643, 645–46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1976) (explaining that individuals engaged in a profession must “observe precautionary rules
established by competent authority to guard against accidents and prevent injuries to others.”).
295. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005)
296. See supra SECTION V.A.
297. EPA labeling regulations include similar ambiguous requirements, necessitating the
agency to adhere to general policy goals rather than merely require certain warnings under a set
list of criteria. C.f. 40 C.F.R. §156.10(i)(1)(i) (2010) (providing labels “must be adequate to
protect the public from fraud and from personal injury and to prevent unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment.”).
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from personal injury,298 adding an explicit requirement that the
administrator consider the labeling’s preemptive effect may protect against
unintentional omissions that, ultimately, would preempt a plaintiff’s worthy
claim.
However, this type of case-by-case analysis may be inappropriate for
EPA because “[t]he decision to displace [state law] is a multifaceted, highstakes discretionary policy judgment that requires considerable
sophistication if it is to be exercised properly.”299 Since, “it is a fair
question whether any legal institution is up to the task,”300 EPA arguably
does not have the institutional competence to undergo federalism analysis at
the same time as science-based label certification and changing political
influence.301 However, a simple change to pesticide labeling can at least
partially address these concerns.
Since designing federal regulatory regimes to rely on state
administration may be more effective than judicial intervention at
incorporating federalism concerns into agency decisionmaking,”302 EPA
should require all pesticide labels include a requirement that commercial
applicators apply the pesticide in a manner consistent with EPA or state
promulgated certification standards.303 This scheme would be advantageous
in a number of ways. First, it would hold pesticide applicators to a standard
commensurate with their training, not the potentially lower standard
included in EPA approved labeling.304 Second, it would remove the federal
preemptive ceiling in regards to pesticide applicators, allowing states to
create their own, more stringent standards for applicators.305 Third, since

298. 40 C.F.R. 156.10(i)(1)(i) (2010).
299. Merrill, supra note 280, at 744.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 755–66 (“[A]gencies know little about constitutional law and usually disclaim any
authority to opine on questions like the scope of the commerce power or other constitutional
provisions bearing on the division of authority between the federal government and the states.
Agencies may also pose a greater threat to stability in the division of authority, given that they are
prone to policy shifts with changes in administration and can act to implement policy shifts much
more quickly than Congress or the courts. In terms of balance, transferring preemption authority
to agencies would increase the capacity of the legal system to displace state law, which would
probably result in a further shift in the direction of more federal authority.”).
302. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2071
(2008).
303. See 40 C.F.R. § 171 (2010) (providing commercial applicator certification guidelines).
304. However, this would also make it more difficult for applicators to determine if they are
committing an unlawful act because the price application standards will not longer be printed on
the pesticide labeling. See 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (2006) (providing it is unlawful for a person
“to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling”).
305. For commercial applicators, this would remove FIFRA’s preemptive ceiling, leaving only
the preemptive floor created by EPA commercial applicator certification regulations. This would
address the federal concerns discussed earlier in this subsection. See 40 C.F.R. § 171.7(e)(1)(i)(C)
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EPA must approve state certification requirements, such a regulation would
promote communication between federal and state authorities. Rather than
completely displacing developments at the state and local level, this would
promote federal and state collaboration and perhaps better promote state
interests.306 Fourth, it would maintain the Bates Court’s requirement that
EPA misbranding requirements control jury verdicts. Upon a defendant’s
request, a trial court would “instruct the jury on the relevant FIFRA
misbranding standards, as well as any regulations that add content to those
standards,”307 including implicitly the EPA or state commercial applicator
certification requirements. The standard of care would no longer be limited
to the labeling, encompassing the entire curriculum required for commercial
applicator certification.308
VI. CONCLUSION
State and federal courts have generally failed to consider EPA labeling
regulations in their preemption analysis in pesticide applicator cases.309
This has left courts divided, often reaching contradictory results based on
fuzzy logic.310 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences reshapes this analysis, holding
that EPA regulations preempt claims against both applicators and
manufactures if they are additional or different than EPA approved
labeling.311 Bates requires courts to consider EPA misbranding
requirements, preempting claims against commercial applicators that
require a different standard of care than included on EPA approved labeling
to comply with EPA labeling regulations.312 Based in part on federalism
concerns, EPA should limit the far reaching effect of this decision.313 On
all pesticide labeling, EPA should require commercial applicators apply the
pesticide in a manner consistent with the training necessitated for state or
federal commercial applicator certification.314

(2010) (State commercial application requirements "[s]hall conform and be at least equal to those
prescribed in § 171.4 for the various categories of applicators utilized by the State.”).
306. Unlike an ordinary preemption regime, this rule would promote communication between
federal and state administrative authorities, effectively circumventing a perceived limitation of
federal preemption. See Buzbee, supra note 285, at 1556 (warning that unitary federal choice
preemption “threatens to displace completely state and local legal developments and the benefits
of intersystemic interaction inherent in federalist schemes”).
307. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences Inc., 544 U.S. 431, 454 (2005).
308. See 40 C.F.R. § 171 (2010) (providing commercial applicator certification guidelines).
309. See supra SECTION IV.
310. See supra SECTION IV.
311. See supra SECTION III.C.
312. See supra SECTION V.A.
313. See supra SECTION V.B.
314. See supra SECTION V.B.

